How Mexico gets it wrong
Defeating the drug cartels depends not on soldiers in the street and strongman tactics but on a more transparent, effective rule of law.
By John M. Ackerman
March 16, 2010
The killing of three people linked to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez on Saturday forces a rethinking of the situation in Mexico. The government's "war on drugs" isn't working.
The violence, which has taken more than 17,000 lives over the last three years, has invaded the very fabric of Mexico's politics, government and society. It is time for the United States to transform its approach by replacing military aid and blind confidence in Mexico's sitting government with support for public institutions and broader citizen diplomacy. In the end, restoring order depends not on soldiers in the street and strongman tactics but on a more transparent, effective rule of law.
The Mexican government tries to defend its policies by minimizing its failures, arguing that 90% of the victims of the escalating violence are criminals. But this tired rhetoric is debunked almost daily by the killings of innocent journalists, human rights activists, students, housewives and maquiladora workers. A month ago, 16 hapless high school students were gunned down at a house party. After first claiming that the victims were most likely gang members, President Felipe Calderon was quickly forced to accept their innocence and issue a public apology for his comments.
Ciudad Juarez is the most violent city in the world: 2,657 homicides (almost 190 per 100,000 inhabitants) were committed during 2009. By comparison, Cali, Colombia, a city three times larger than Juarez and renowned for its urban violence, reported 1,615 homicides last year.
Two years ago, as part of the drug war, the Mexican military took over the Juarez police force, but that has only made the problem worse. The number of homicides has increased tenfold, from an average of 20 killings a month to almost 200, based on data published by Reforma newspaper. The military has proven to be lethargic in responding to emergencies and totally unprepared to investigate crimes. The constant presence of armed soldiers in the streets has worked to intimidate the population and create a generalized culture of fear rather than to scare away the criminals.
Last week, the United Nations Human Rights Commission was particularly tough on Mexico for the dramatic increase in human rights abuses related to the battle with organized crime. It asked hard questions about the use of the military for law enforcement activities and the legal immunity granted to military personnel who commit human rights abuses. It also expressed concern about the continued presence of torture and the increasing use of arbitrary pretrial detention as a strategy to combat crime. All of this while the homicide rate steadily rises.
One of the central problems with Calderon's approach to fighting the drug cartels is the lack of independent oversight of law enforcement agencies and the military. This strategy of insulation has created a breeding ground for corruption. In 2009, Mexico received a score of 3.3 out of 10 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, tied with Rwanda and Malawi and below Guatemala and El Salvador. Independent surveys systematically reveal that more than two-thirds of the Mexican population distrusts the police. A worrisome 70% of the Mexican population is now unsatisfied with democracy itself.
But instead of creating new oversight mechanisms or strengthening existing ones, Calderon has moved in the opposite direction. A recent reform prohibits citizen access to any information handled by criminal investigators, even for years after cases have been formally closed. Another legal change prevents Mexico's National Human Rights Commission from obtaining information on how suspects are treated by law enforcement officials. Calderon has also sent a bill to Congress proposing to shut down the country's only federal anti-corruption agency. And he has proposed a law that would allow the executive branch to unilaterally declare a "state of emergency" without any congressional oversight.
When President Obama visited Africa last year, he issued a clear message against corruption and the abuse of power. "No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves, or police can be bought off by drug traffickers," he said. "Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions."
But Obama has turned this logic on its head in his relationship with Mexico. He rarely misses an opportunity to express his "total confidence" in Calderon's strongman tactics, and only 15% of the $1.4-billion Merida plan -- the U.S. aid package directed toward helping fight the cartels -- is earmarked for "institution-building and the rule of law." The rest is for military and technological support.
Michelle Obama's visit to Mexico next month -- her first solo visit to a foreign nation -- may offer an opportunity for the United States to emphasize nonmilitary issues in the relationship between the two nations. She would do well to complement her meeting with Mexico's first lady, Margarita Zavala, with engagement with civil society groups. A conversation with the increasingly active community of widows and orphans of the drug war, for instance, would give her a broader perspective on the situation. This sort of branching out would be warmly welcomed by the Mexican people and may hold the key to developing new bilateral strategies for reducing violence and promoting prosperity on both sides of the border.
John M. Ackerman is a professor at the Institute for Legal Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, editor in chief of the Mexican Law Review and a columnist for La Jornada newspaper and Proceso magazine. johnackerman.blogspot.com
Copyright © 2010, The Los Angeles Times
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